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Abstract
In this paper, using core concepts from personal pedagogy, reflective practice and 
cognitive theory as a theoretical base, I examine the energising effect of humour and its 
contribution to my development of new and useful meanings for what was otherwise a
tired and tiring practice problem: the teaching of in-text referencing to undergraduate 
Business students. The major contribution of this paper to theory is that it acknowledges 
the impact of cognitive depletion on reflective practice and posits the use of humour as a 
partial remedy to this problem. The paper also contributes to practice by re-inventing the 
use of metaphor as a reflective practice strategy and, perhaps most importantly, by 
giving academics permission to bring some much needed, energising irreverence and joy 
to their work.
Introduction
This paper engages with the conference and journal issue theme “meanings emerging in 
practice” on two levels. First, it argues as a general principle that finding the humorous 
edge to practice problems can change the meanings and energy surrounding those 
problems. Thereby making them potentially more manageable. While this may seem a 
frivolous practice strategy and one of limited utility, given the extraordinary work 
pressures facing academics, it is argued in this paper that it is exactly the depleting and 
constricting nature of contemporary academic work that humour is so uniquely and 
powerfully suited to remedy. This paper then engages with the conference and journal 
issue theme on a second and more practical level, by telling the story of my attempts to 
find a better way to teach in-text referencing and plagiarism avoidance, and the 
definitive contribution of humour to my resolution of this issue. Specifically this paper 
relates how my enjoyment of the humorous metaphor in the title of this paper seemed to 
offer me the energy and the mindset I needed to finalise the in-text referencing decision-
tree that I had hitherto had such difficulty capturing on paper. Prior to the injection of 
humour into my conception of the problem, my attempts to articulate the decision-tree, 
despite repeated attempts over a protracted period, were unsuccessful.
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The opening section of the literature review of this paper is based on the old dictum that 
the seeds for the resolution of a problem reside first and foremost in the way that the 
problem is defined. Reflective practice is presented as the pre-eminent mechanism for 
defining practice problems (and therefore for solving practice problems), given its role in 
the identification of, and changing of, the meanings that practitioners attribute to practice 
problems. The literature review continues, making a strong case for academics to engage 
regularly in reflective practice, while the depleting nature of contemporary academic 
work is identified as a major barrier to reflective practice. It is important to note that this 
barrier is largely unaddressed in the literature. Indeed, most strategies for managing the 
high demands of contemporary academic work do not acknowledge the vulnerable, finite 
nature of academics as people and their need for renewal at an individual, psychological 
level. Rather, implicitly academics are constructed as mechanical instruments of their 
work who merely need inputs such as additional time and/or the removal of structural 
barriers to function. The literature review concludes by identifying the unique capacity 
of humour (and the positive emotions that it conjures) to renew both mind and energy at 
an individual, psychological level, and also to facilitate reflective practice and 
engagement with meanings emerging in practice. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as a three part narrative of my attempts to 
design an in-text referencing decision-tree. The first component of the story is the 
prequel, which explains how and why I wanted to design an in-text referencing decision-
tree (for use in my teaching). The second instalment recounts one of my thwarted 
attempts to design the decision-tree, prior to my reframing the problem through the use 
of humour. This is an episode in which I felt that I had behaved “badly or 
‘unprofessionally’”; as Brookfield (1987, p. 99) suggests, these incidents can be 
particularly fruitful points at which to consider the meanings given to practice problems.
In the final episode I recount the advent of the humorous metaphor to describe 
plagiarism and the subsequent ‘moment’ when I was finally able to record the decision-
tree on paper. This is another kind of practice situation – a moment of great “personal 
satisfaction…[in which a practitioner feels that they have] done a good job” (Brookfield, 
1987, p. 98) – that can also be a particularly useful point at which to reflect on the 
meanings attributed to practice problems. The structure of the paper having been 
outlined, it is now appropriate to delve into the theoretical framework of the paper in 
more detail.
Literature Review
A core theme of this paper is that humour has a significant capacity to reframe old 
problems and give them new meanings, thereby making humour a particularly powerful 
facilitator of reflective practice. As a prelude to outlining the contribution of humour to 
reflective practice, it is appropriate to outline the place of ‘meaning’ within reflective 
practice because, despite the many differing forms of reflective practice (witness the 
work of Schön [1987], Brookfield [1987] and Tripp [1993], to name but a few), notions 
of reflective practice are concerned with the underpinning meanings that drive our actions 
in practice situations. Professional practice is routinely constructed (within reflective 
practice literature) as a continuous loop process of making sense of the workplace, of 
taking actions based on those understandings, followed by more sense-making and so 
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forth (Gioia,1986, p. 51). Within this cycle “[s]ensemaking is meaning construction. It is 
the process whereby people attempt to construct meaningful explanations for situations 
and their experiences within those situations” (Gioia, 1986, p. 61; emphasis in original).
Let me illustrate the significance of meaning and its capacity to drive actions with a brief 
scenario.
Imagine that you have just become aware that you are now standing in an 
unfamiliar room. Behind you, you hear strange noises. You turn in time to see one 
man plunging a sharp object into another man’s side. You act immediately.
The action that you imagined yourself taking will have been driven by the meanings that 
you attributed this scenario. For example, some will have assumed that they were 
witnessing a murder and acted accordingly, while others will have assumed that they 
were witnessing lifesaving surgery and acted accordingly. Therefore, somewhat 
paradoxically, to understand our own and others’ actions we need to give our attention to 
the thoughts and meanings that drive actions, rather than to the actions themselves. The 
actions are the outward embodiment of these meanings. Therefore, within reflective 
practice, meaning is privileged over action as an object for reflection (Schön, 1987, 
1983). In other words, given the role of meaning in ‘driving’ behaviour we need to focus 
on the why of our actions rather than the what.
This may all seem self-evident and you may be wondering, “Why all this fuss about 
meaning? If the scenario situation was a real life situation, a witness would have 
sufficient information – just from being in the room where the action was taking place –
to make a considered decision and act accordingly”. If a murder was witnessed then 
certain actions would follow and if surgery was witnessed then alternative actions would 
follow.
The reasons for the fuss about and the focus on meaning reside in the human capacity 
unintentionally to get the meanings of situations horribly wrong and therefore the actions 
undertaken in those situations also horribly wrong. You may believe that it would always 
be easy to discern the difference between the presenting circumstances of a murder as 
opposed to lifesaving surgery. It was, however, a battle over these exact meanings that 
lay at the heart of the recent Dr Death scandal that engulfed Queensland Health.
Dr Jayant Patel has since been implicated in the deaths of at least 80 patients during his 
period as director of surgery at the Bundaberg hospital (Mancuso, 2005). Prior to the 
media exposé of the problem, complaints about Patel were dismissed by senior staff – for 
example, as evidence of a personality clash between Dr Patel and whistleblower nurse 
Toni Hoffman (Mancuso, 2005). Eventually Queensland Health stopped regarding Patel 
as a caring and competent surgeon and Dr Patel is, as a consequence, currently facing 
legal proceedings (Mancuso, 2005). It took, however, a titanic battle to change those 
original very positive and entrenched perceptions of Patel. Reflective practice reveals that 
we cannot trust our assumptions, particularly our automatic assumptions about practice 
situations. For the focus of reflective practice is not merely the conscious or explicit 
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meanings that we give to practice problems but also the unconscious or implicit meanings 
that we give to those problems (Argyris & Schön, 1974).
The importance of ‘meaning’ within reflective practice having been established, it is now 
appropriate to consider why reflective practice is in itself a worthwhile activity because, 
however reflective practice is undertaken, the literature is replete with statements of its 
benefits. Excellence in teaching in universities is attributed at least in part to reflective 
practice (Kane, Sandretto & Heath, 2004). It is the pre-eminent mechanism for the 
creation of “personal theory” derived from “practitioners” (as opposed to “grand theory” 
derived from “academic researchers”) as a form of professional knowledge (Tripp, 1998,
p. 31). It provides a mechanism for the integration of the self into one’s practice and the 
accrued benefits of more meaningful work (Ojanen, 1996). Finally, it is capable of 
generating viable applied solutions to the problems that practitioners face in the 
workplace that are unlikely to be found in traditional formal bodies of professional 
knowledge (Cervero, 1990, as cited in Ferry & Ross-Gordon, 1998, p. 98; Schön, 1983, 
1987).
However, despite the accolades heaped upon reflective practice, significant problems 
exist with the way that it is constructed. In the literature reflective practice seems 
implicitly to be constructed as an essentially ‘resource neutral’ activity. Most particularly, 
the difficulty that academics experience in finding the cognitive resources or ‘energy’ for 
regular, ongoing, reflective practice is largely unacknowledged in these discussions. The 
consensus is that reflective practice needs to be a regular and intense activity. 
Remarkably, while the taxing, and at times personally threatening, nature of reflective 
practice is acknowledged (Brookfield, 1987, pp. 89-90) reflective practice theorists seem 
strangely silent on the matter of how practitioners go about mustering the mental and 
emotional energy for this promethean task. The significance of this ‘resource neutral’
construction of reflective practice becomes clearer when the nature of cognitive depletion 
and the depleting nature of contemporary academic work are understood.
Cognitive resource depletion is a kind of mental incapacity. It can be induced in research 
participants in laboratory settings quite easily – for example, by asking participants to 
multitask (Gilbert, 1991, p. 111). More generally, resource depletion occurs because:
…the self [is regarded as having] one limited stock of some resource that resembles 
energy or strength [which it uses]…for many different tasks including regulating 
thoughts, controlling emotions, inhibiting impulses, sustaining physical stamina and 
persisting in the face of frustration. (Scheichel, Volis & Baumeister, 2003, p. 33)
When those resources are depleted, our cognitive functioning is affected deleteriously; 
we are simply less able to perform effectively higher order tasks such as “active problem 
solving” (Scheichel, Volis & Baumeister, 2003, p. 33). The case can be made that 
reflective practice is certainly a form of active problem solving and is therefore 
dramatically compromised when academics are depleted. Perhaps more illuminating, 
when depleted, people generally become more open to persuasion – in extreme cases, to 
the point where we will begin to accept propositions that we are aware are false (Gilbert,
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1991, p. 111). In these circumstances the identification and rejection of flawed meanings 
driving practice – the cornerstone of reflective practice – become very problematic.
A number of factors could be identified as likely culprits for a general depletion of 
academics in the contemporary work context. They include increased demands on 
academics in terms of emotional labour (Constani & Gibbs, 2004), claims from university 
administrators for service delivery to students on a 24/7 basis (Spennemann, 2007, p. 39) 
and the extensification (extending the hours of work) and intensification (extending the 
volume of work) (Worrall & Cooper, 2007, p. 131) of academic work. 
While many barriers to reflective practice are acknowledged in the literature, the 
‘resource sensitive’ nature of reflective practice itself seems unaddressed. For example, 
the suggestion that academics simply need “more time” to be able to engage in reflective
practice (Kuit, Reay & Freeman, 2001, p. 140) is inadequate as it implies that the extra 
time will be used working, rather than recovering from work. It overlooks depletion as an 
issue. Similarly, while calls for the removal of structural barriers to reflective practice 
(Davis, 2003) are laudable as long-term strategies, this still leaves academics with no 
immediate strategy for engaging in reflective practice in the prevailing depleting 
circumstances.
The literature surrounding work induced fatigue and/or depletion offers few answers for 
academics. Certainly, if opportunities are given to workers within the day to recuperate 
and/or if sufficient time is available after work to recuperate, then work induced fatigue is 
a manageable phenomenon (van Veidhoven & Broersen, 2003). Similarly, sleep can 
assist in recovery from depletion (Baumeister, Heatherton & Tice, 1994, as cited in 
Baumeister 2003). However, these are strategies for avoiding excessive depletion, not 
strategies for engaging in reflective practice when already in a state of depletion. Further, 
the “traditional scholarly inseparability of research work and personal pleasure” (Barcan, 
1996, p. 136, as cited in Anderson, 2006, p. 585) makes it unlikely that academics would 
adopt these strategies. In order to preserve some semblance of a professional identity in 
the currently managerialist climate, academics pursue their research and other forms of 
scholarship in what would otherwise be regarded as ‘recreation’ or recovery time (long 
service leave, recreational leave, after work hours) despite the resulting “exhaustion and 
demoralisation” (Anderson, 2006, pp. 586-8).
Possibly the most promising lead within this literature is the finding that the experience 
of positive emotions (Baumeister, Dale, Dhavale, & Tice, unpublished data, 2002, as 
cited in Baumeister, 2003) can aid recovery from depletion. Positive emotions include 
“joy, interest, contentment, and love, [and] share the feature of building the individual's 
personal resources, ranging from physical resources to intellectual resources to social 
resources” (Fredrickson, 1998, p. 307). Possibly of more importance to the question of 
reflective practice, these same emotions also “broaden an individual's momentary 
thought–action repertoire, encouraging the individual to pursue a wider range of thoughts 
or actions than is typical” (Fredrickson, 1998, p. 312). Positive emotions therefore not 
only resource practitioners to engage more effectively in reflective practice but also 
create the kind of open mindset that is uniquely suited to reflective practice.
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It seems reasonable to assume that humour is associated at least with the experience of 
joy and interest as positive emotions. Certainly humour in instructional situations can 
actively lower student anxiety (Berk, 1996) and can create greater “attentiveness and 
interest and…make principles seem less abstract” (Berk, 2002, as cited in Walker, 2005, 
p. 118). Humour therefore has the potential not only to resource practitioners but also to 
facilitate an open mindset conducive to reflective practice through its association with 
positive emotions.
Humour in professional practice is, however, not an over-reported phenomenon in the 
professional practice literature. Davidson and O'Brien (1997, as cited in Struthers, 1999, 
p. 1120) suggest that this may be an artefact of professional education processes that 
focus on “emotional distancing [from clients] and conformity of professional practice”.
Humour is certainly characterised by a certain amount of unpredictability and human 
engagement that may not fit with traditional notions of professional practice.
There is a small amount of literature celebrating the contribution of humour specifically 
to reflective practice that acknowledges the role of humour in creating new meanings for 
existing problems. Greenwood and Levin (1998, as cited in Jenkins, 2007, p. 68)
acknowledge the capacity of humour to open “up patterns of thought to new possibilities 
[and to evoke]…tacit knowledge”. Similarly, Jenkins (2007, p. 68) acknowledges the 
contribution of humour as a stimulus for “deeper thinking [and the appreciation of] 
different perspectives”.
Similarly, the regenerative qualities of humour within reflective practice are 
acknowledged by Miller, East, Fitzgerald, Heston and Veenstra (2002, p. 83). They 
positively regard the experience of humour and diversion as an alternative to more task-
oriented approaches to reflective practice and instead actively pursue “wanderfahring, a 
way of enjoying the journey, taking inviting side roads as it were” (p. 83) in their 
community of practice.
An overview of the theoretical contribution of humour to reflective practice (as a source 
of new meanings for practice problems and as a remedy for cognitive depletion) having 
been presented, it is now appropriate to relate these understandings to the story of the 
development of the decision-tree.
The Prequel
This story begins after I had been living with a needling question for a few years in my 
role as a course leader for a large undergraduate Business course, MGT1000 
Organisational Behaviour and Management. That question was, “Is there a better way to 
teach in-text referencing?”. The primary reasons for my interest in flawed in-text 
referencing were the burgeoning plagiarism incidence rates evident in the higher 
education sector (Brimble & Stevenson-Clarke, 2005, p. 36) and the fact that flawed in-
text referencing persisted in student scripts despite my adoption of a range of academic 
literacy and plagiarism minimisation strategies in my teaching. Specific strategies that I 
adopted to improve in-text referencing included the provision of models of academic 
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writing incorporating in-text referencing, opportunities to practise in-text referencing, the 
delivery of the usual homilies on the evils of plagiarism and direction of students to the 
university website on in-text referencing.
Through reflective discussions with colleagues I came to regard referencing as having 
two components: a scholarly component (for example, related to the building of an 
academic case using multiple sources) and a technical component (for example, related 
to the adoption of correct protocols for recording an in-text reference). While my team 
and I had made progress in making the hidden rules of scholarly referencing explicit, I 
had had less success in finding a timely and engaging way to orient students to in-text 
referencing protocols. In a moment of inspiration, I determined that a decision-tree 
would be the way to do this, as it would spell out the hierarchy of decisions and 
responses implicit in in-text referencing. Rather than teaching the minutiae of in-text 
referencing in all its permutations, I could teach students how to use the tool and 
generate the responses that they needed as they needed them.
The idea of a decision-tree sat particularly well with me as it dovetailed nicely with one 
of the instructional design principles of my personal pedagogy: that whatever changes I
make to instructional materials these should not ‘suck the life force out of the teaching 
team or the students’. Please note that invoking this ‘clause’ would not permit me or the 
teaching team simply to abandon an innovation. If the innovation met additional criteria 
– that it was going to be equitable for students and add value educationally to the course 
– then my colleagues and I would simply find a less depleting way to accomplish the 
same task. Also please note that I have chosen to use the vernacular to describe this 
principle, as for me personal pedagogy is not about the confirmation of voices that 
already exist in the literature but rather is about bringing new voices – teachers’ voices –
to the table (Clandinin & Connelly, 1998). A decision-tree would make in-text 
referencing easier for students by making tacit knowledge about in-text referencing 
explicit and would make teaching in-text referencing easier for me by making this task 
smaller and more focused. I just had to teach students how to use the tree instead of 
teaching them all the details of in-text referencing.
While it may seem that, the decision to design a decision–tree having been made, this 
story should therefore almost be over. Instead, this is where the story gets really 
interesting. The decision-tree actually required a considerable incubation time –
approximately two years incubation time, in fact. Incubation as a stage within the 
creative process refers to the period in which one mulls over a problem subconsciously 
rather than consciously (Kuratko & Hodgetts, 2007, p. 145). The perennial needling of 
this problem over this period was not a particularly pleasant experience but, I have 
subsequently realised, completely consistent with processes of reflective practice. In 
reality, “reflection…includes the acceptance of a problem, the endurance of anxiety 
caused by a long period of work until you have the knowledge needed and the 
recapitulation, as well as the re-interpretation of that problem based on new data”
(Ojanen, 1993, as cited in Ojanen, 1996, p. 2). Before I acquire a reputation as an in-text 
referencing tragic, I need to explain that over this two years on perhaps four occasions I 
sat down for no more than 15 minutes each time and tried to draft this decision-tree with 
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no luck before I developed the tree on the fifth attempt. This next discussion focuses on
my recollection of one of those unsuccessful attempts.
A Moment When I was Least Satisfied in My Work
The moment when I felt least satisfied with my conduct and my work was towards the 
end of one of those unsuccessful attempts to create the decision-tree. I knew that I was 
tired, pressed for time and had multiple competing tasks also requiring immediate action 
– a familiar refrain for most academics, I expect. However, I had what I suspect most 
academics don’t have: a personally defensible way to exit the task and defer it for 
another day, by simply invoking my “this is sucking the life force out of me at this 
stage” principle. Previously, I had had for at least 20 years an undiagnosed illness –
coeliacs disease - that had left me chronically and inexplicably fatigued. Therefore the
legitimacy of the need to husband my energy was and remains never far from my 
thoughts, even though the fatigue is no longer an issue and the illness controlled by a 
relatively simple dietary regime.
Interestingly enough, the episode unfolded like this:
I am sitting at my desk, trying to develop an in-text referencing decision tree. I 
have my pencil in hand and have turned a blank A4 page to landscape and start 
considering where to begin. “Do I start with the number of authors involved?” “Do
I start with the form of the quote as direct or paraphrase?” “Do I start by 
determining when page numbers needed to be included?” I physically refer to the 
linear list of referencing protocols provided on the library website on a kind of trial 
and error basis. I keep coming up with a zillion mini-decision-trees rather than a 
single decision-tree. My plan is to fit this onto one A4 page. It is not happening. I 
am feeling a little anxious. I thought this would be easier. “I am an insider, I know 
how to reference. This should not be this hard!” I find myself thinking about the 
lecture I need to prepare and make photocopies for next week. “This decision-tree 
is really icing on the cake. I do quite a deal of stuff on the technical and scholarly 
aspects of referencing already in this course.” I plug on a little longer with no joy. I 
wonder why I am sitting here wasting my time like this. I am finding it harder to 
keep trying to order all these unrelated micro instructions. I start to feel resentful 
towards students. “Why am I working so hard at this? Students need to get a grip 
and knuckle down and just do it – the way I had to.” I am not completely 
comfortable with my “Students just need to pull themselves together” rant, but I 
really have run out of time and this is too hard to do in a few minutes. I will try 
again later and students need to just get over it!
For me this first vignette is all about the role of depletion in stymieing reflection. The 
inability to settle into the task strikes me as evidence of a kind of depletion. The 
persisting awareness of competing tasks and deadlines is consistent with a “task-oriented 
approach to time” that academics are being forced to adopt as work demands increase 
(Anderson, 2006, p. 588). In this vignette, as timely completion of the task became a 
more remote possibility I started to create a new set of meanings about the task that 
ultimately gave me permission to disengage from it. At the time of disengaging from the 
task I felt relieved and a little empowered as I was shedding a task in an otherwise over 
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scheduled semester. However, in reality my single act of “resistance” involved me merely 
ceasing one task to undertake another immediately; behaviour consistent with Anderson’s
(2006, p. 587) construction of academics as “docile workers who have internalised 
management-imposed cultural norms”.
The general thrust of the accompanying self-talk locked me into a “deficit discourse”
about students that conceptualised them as incomplete, inadequate, “under prepared or 
intellectually deficient” (Lawrence, 2005, p. 245). This discourse gave me permission to 
disengage from the task as the problem of in-text referencing became the students’ 
problem, not mine. This is a classic example of what Loughran (2002, p. 35) calls 
“rationalisation masquerading as reflection”. I can say with confidence that, while this 
line of thought gave me a way to exit from this task, even at the time of mounting this 
case I was not comfortable with this reasoning. Attributing a meaning to a work situation 
is not a process of “discovering some existing reality but of creating it” (Gioia, 1986, p.
51; emphasis in original). In engaging this discourse I then created a workplace that I did 
not want to inhabit. The relationship with students became competitive – with my time 
and resources – and therefore adversarial. Students became depersonalised as unrelenting 
parasites. I was cast in a self-serving victim role. However, despite having engaged with 
this discourse, ultimately I continued to persist in trying to create the decision-tree. This 
indicates to me that I did not accept the values underpinning this discourse in the long 
term. But somehow, paradoxically, I did accept them in the short term.
It struck me as curious how these conceptions had any purchase at all within my practice 
framework. My original training as a special education teacher should have meant that I 
was unlikely to adopt this kind of ‘deficit model’ of students – given the ethos in that 
branch of teaching and my very thorough socialisation into it. I do not mean to ascribe 
myself any moral superiority that would make me above deficit discourses – instead I 
was curious why I would pick that rationale for disengaging from the task given its 
obvious conflict with my espoused framework for practice and the presence of a 
perfectly serviceable alternative rationale, that the task was sucking the life force out of 
me. Indeed, I now attribute the brief ascendancy of these meanings to what I would 
describe in everyday language as flawed judgment as a result of work induced fatigue.
The theory would more correctly describe this as evidence of a truncated judgment 
process induced by cognitive depletion (Gilbert, 1991), which was itself a result of the 
extensification and intensification (Worrall & Cooper, 2007, p. 131) of academic work.
In short, according to Gilbert (1991) it takes more effort (cognitively) to reject an idea 
than it takes to accept an idea. The rejection of an idea is a two stage process. In the first 
stage one initially understands (and therefore automatically accepts) the idea. Please note 
that judgment of the idea is not suspended until after scrutiny of the idea has occurred;
rather acceptance of the idea automatically accompanies understanding the idea in the 
first stage. In the second stage, scrutiny of the idea occurs, which may ultimately lead to 
rejection of the idea. However, “when faced with shortages of time, energy, or conclusive 
evidence…[this second stage is truncated and consequently people] may fail to unaccept 
the ideas that they involuntarily accept during comprehension” (Gilbert, 1991, p. 116).
This is, I believe, in part what happened in my thinking. I colluded with a readily 
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available deficit discourse (by subjecting it to insufficient scrutiny) to create a quick and 
easy, ‘resource conserving’ exit from the task.
Moments When I was Most Satisfied in my Work
The moments when I was most satisfied with my work on the decision-tree included 
those when I was chortling to myself about a throwaway line that I made in an informal 
staff meeting about plagiarism:
“Maybe we need a new way to market in-text referencing to students – perhaps as 
the [I pause for effect] condom of good scholarship, rather than as the [I pause and 
hear myself say with some surprise and delight]…suppository of good 
scholarship”. As I say this I think I am hilarious, but maybe I just need to get out 
more!
This final vignette is for me primarily about the role of resourcefulness in facilitating 
reflection, as it was when I was laughing about my new metaphor that the first iteration 
of the decision-tree appeared. In other words, while enjoying the joke in the metaphor I 
had the energy or the insight to start to order and organise the questions embedded in in-
text referencing. This was ultimately a deceptively easy process involving just two 
questions. Question one was, “Are you using your own words in this in-text reference?”,
to which students could answer, “Yes, I am using my own words” or “No, I am using 
someone else’s words” or “Yes and no; I am using some of my words and some of 
someone else’s words”. This was followed by question two: “Are you citing a major 
theme of the publication in this in-text reference?” The answers to this second question 
led students to one of the four archetypes of in-text referencing presented in the decision-
tree. The decision-tree is accompanied by reference sheets which list exceptions to the 
rules in terms of sources with what students would refer to as “dodgy authors” such as 
government publications that lack a clear personal author and “dodgy dates” such as 
publications with unknown dates.
Having stumbled unto this humorous metaphor, I found that the task of developing a 
decision-tree somehow suddenly became easy, simple and enjoyable rather than being 
exhausting, frustrating and overwhelming. I experienced the development of the 
decision-tree through a veil of positive emotions that I feel had their origin in my altered 
view of in-text referencing. This is consistent with the “idea experience” or “eureka 
factor” within the creative process when “the idea or solution the individual is seeking is 
discovered…often while the person is doing something unrelated to the enterprise” 
(Kurato & Hodgetts, 2007, pp. 145-146). Suggested strategies for facilitating creativity 
include “day-dream[ing] or fantasiz[ing] about…[the] project…[working in] a leisurely 
environment…[and taking] breaks while working” (Kurato & Hodgetts, 2007, p. 146), 
all of which intuitively seem likely to facilitate the positive emotions that Fredrickson 
(1998) already identified as important to cognitive renewal. Further recollections of my 
reflections on the new metaphor illustrate the extent of the shift in my perception of the 
whole issue:
Even if this metaphor drove other people at the meeting crazy, I think there might 
be something in it. The metaphor continued, condoms keep people safe; it’s the 
same deal with in-text referencing. By safe I mean original source authors are 
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protected from theft and students are protected from charges of plagiarism. It is 
utterly ridiculous but it kind of works. This is the first good laugh I have ever had 
about in-text referencing and it has been a long time coming! I extend the metaphor 
further by suddenly recalling the experience of creative flow in writing. Writing is 
about creativity; it is about getting that natural high from unselfconscious periods 
of intense concentration. I can’t believe I had forgotten the experience of creative 
flow in all my spiels on essay writing to students. All I have talked about is the 
pain and the perils of academic writing (including in-text referencing) and none of 
the joys in academic writing. No wonder students had had enough! You want the 
joy of physical intimacy, you use a condom; you want the joy of intellectual 
intimacy, you use in-text referencing. I don’t need to use the metaphor in my actual
teaching of students but certainly my teaching can benefit from the insights it has 
offered me.
I have subsequently couched my teaching of in-text referencing in a context that 
celebrates the joy and the excitement of the experience of creative flow (Robbins, Millett 
& Waters-Marsh, 2004) within academic writing. A very rough survey of students after 
submission of their assignments in MGT1000 Organisational Behaviour and 
Management indicated that approximately two thirds of the 80 students who were 
surveyed had experienced creative flow in writing their assignments and enjoyed it.
Anecdotally they reported that this experience was not, however, something that they 
routinely heard about in discussions of academic literacy or plagiarism avoidance. Upon 
reflection it seems sad and self-defeating that in robbing this area of instruction of joy I 
had quite possibly also robbed students of the energy that they need to engage with this 
aspect of academic literacy.
Conclusion
This paper has engaged with the issue of the emergence of meaning in practice on two
levels. First, it has identified humour as a hitherto underrated facilitator of reflection and 
provided a theory-based explanation of its possible efficacy. Second, on a very practical 
level it has recounted the story of my attempts to develop an in-text referencing decision-
tree for use by students, the critical change in my practice occurring as a result of the 
injection of humour into my reflections on this issue. It remains now to consider the 
practical implications and conclusions that can be drawn from this discussion.
A major component of the significance of this paper resides in the potential utility of the 
products of reflection for myself and other practitioners. This may occur at a simple 
instrumental level where for example a teaching tool, such as the idea of a decision-tree,
can simply be adopted and adapted by another practitioner. Indeed, other, more
traditional and formal bodies of professional knowledge do not tend to provide simple 
applied solutions for the challenges that practitioners face in the workplace today 
(Cervero, 1990, as cited in Ferry & Ross-Gordon, 1998, p. 98; Schön, 1983, 1987). It is 
worth noting that approximately half of the 80 MGT1000 Organisational Behaviour and 
Management students surveyed about the utility of the decision-tree said that it was the 
easiest of the referencing tools available to them, that they had used it in writing their 
paper and that they felt that they would use it again in the future. While this survey had 
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its limitations, it has certainly confirmed my intention to continue the decision-tree 
approach to the teaching of in-text referencing.
Possibly more importantly, it has confirmed my commitment within my personal 
pedagogy to giving considerable attention to what is ostensibly the least rewarding and 
most intractable areas of my practice, for these areas can contain the most important 
lessons about practice meanings and assumptions. In this instance, in large part the lack 
of reward in this area stemmed from the difficulty that I experienced in changing the 
format of in-text referencing information from a linear format to a decision-tree format. 
Paradoxically, instead of seeing my difficulty in designing the decision-tree as evidence 
of the complex tacit knowledge embedded in referencing, instead of seeing this as an 
explanation of the difficulty that students experience when learning referencing 
techniques, instead of seeing this as a politically and pedagogically significant area of 
practice, I found it easier to neglect this area of practice. This is a lesson for the future.
A further contribution of this paper resides in the potential utility of the process of 
reflection for myself and other practitioners. In concrete terms, the way that other
practitioners think about their practice may be changed as a result of exposure to the 
process of reflection embedded in this story (Brookfield, 1995, pp. 218-219). Thus, 
others may simply choose to permit humour to have a greater legitimacy within their 
reflective processes in future. I certainly will. Similarly, new metaphors other than those 
related to war and criminality are needed to frame the discourse surrounding plagiarism 
(Hasen & Huppert, 2005). While no mechanism for creating these new metaphors has 
been forthcoming in the literature, perhaps humour may have a role in changing the 
underlying assumptions dominating the current discourse surrounding plagiarism.
An allied contribution of this paper is its subtext message about the need for work–life 
balance for academics. Through its discussion of the experience of ‘depletion’ and 
‘resourcefulness’ in the workplace, it affirms the humanity of academics and the need for 
them to be considered as more than depersonalised instruments of the higher education 
agenda. Perhaps the most important and paradoxically most easily dismissed 
contribution of this paper is the case that it makes for the restoration of a little more joy 
and a little less hard work within the academic workload.
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